Monday, August 08, 2005

Cheese-divided Avocado Salad, with Sweet Chilli Sauce

  • cut an avocado in half lengthwise, place each half cut down and cut each of them into vertical slices across their width.
    • make the slices, say, about 1/2 cm thick
  • the next step is to place slices of cheese between the slices of avocado
    • you can make the cheese slices approx the same size as the avocado slices
      • and probably a bit thinner, so they don’t overwhelm the milder avocado
    • tasty cheese works fairly well for this, and I imagine that mild cheese would as well
  • sprinkle some sliced spanish olives on top
  • sprinkle a little salt and pepper, then drizzle some sweet chilli sauce on top of it all

Friday, August 05, 2005

F. Scott Fitzgerald Line on What Makes Intelligence

An F. Scott Fitzgerald line that I saw mentioned -- in an incdental way -- on Slashdot:

"The test of a first-rate intelligence is the ability to hold two opposing ideas in mind at the same time and still retain the ability to function."
Spot-on, I think. Or, at least, I think it's a good test.

I think that, to a large extent at least, intelligence involves an ability to control and manipulate your thought processes -- and that test checks for a high-level of that. It tests your ability to be able to hold an idea, not simply as a belief which is directly connected up to your attitudes, opinons and actions, but as a piece of passive information that you can subject to evaluation and thought.

Wednesday, July 27, 2005

Difficulties in Later Learning of 'Technical' Languages?

I'm wondering, since we have trouble mastering a spoken language if we start learning it after the end of puberty (or thereabouts, as I understand it), does this apply to what you might call 'technical languages' such as the concepts in something like statistics or other branches of maths? Is it that if we learn them later in life we are not able to think with them as dexterously? Even though we treat these things as distinct from spoken language, it's not obvious (to me at least) that the brain necessarily should. I'm wondering what research has been done into this, or what knowledge might give us clues to the answer?

'Inner voice' as General purpose Intra-brain Communication Mechanism?

No time to write this up properly.... I wonder if one of the major reasons for our 'inner voice' is as a general purpose means by which information can be communicated between the various brain 'modules'?

It seems likely to me that the information 'vocalise' through our 'inner voice' is processed and filtered through to all parts of the brain that would normally receive information about the sounds (and thus speech) that we would hear through our ears. This would mean that if the brain can internally produce information and turn it into speech the 'inner voice' that all these areas of the brain can be informed of that.

Though I don't have time to try and think of what the reasons for this are, this seems more likely to me than always having all of these special purpose communication channels through the brain (perhaps it is because that might be duplication? Also, note that I'm not trying to deny the existence of special purpose communication channels).

I have heard that the 'inner voice' was likely to have been a later evolutionary development than the ability to hear and process language or language-like statements, and this intra-brain communication usage would thus have been one of the benefits it could have brought.

I don't know what might have been written about this idea already, and all I can say is that I have read a few things that I think ought to have mentioned such an idea if the author had been aware of it.

Sunday, July 24, 2005

Example of Thought Substituted With Judgements Based on Perceived Characteristics

The italicised text in the following quoted passage is pointing out an example of the lazy substitution of thought with judgements based on perceived characteristics.

It's showing a case where, rather than thinking about whether a certain classification (in this case ‘art’) is appropriate in a particular case, this decision is made only by looking for certain characteristics that we take as markers for that classification.

We'll automatically perceive something as being, or not being, of that classification on the basis of the presence or absence of these characteristics.

Howard Jacobson writes:

We are right to shrink from the very idea of a "funny" book. There should be no such genre. We should expect laughter to be integral to the business of being serious. We are back in a new dark age of the imagination. We read to sleep. Either we refuse the idea of art altogether (something we do with every page of a Dan Brown novel we turn), or we confer integrity on it from outside, allowing it to be art only by virtue of the pre-determined importance of its subject matter, or the acceptability of its attitudes. This is a species of censorship to which we have all acceded. (my emphasis)


The article this passage is quoted from is here. I actually have only skimmed through it -- it's just that that sentence caught my eye.

Sunday, July 17, 2005

""

All times come

(...sounded nice...no idea whose lines I might be repeating here)

Thursday, July 14, 2005

Venter, Kurzweil and Brooks on the Cutting Edge of Biology

A long but exciting article on how Craig Venter, Ray Kurzweil and Rodney Brooks envisage the cutting-edge path being marked out in the combination of biology and information technology. For example, Venter talks about some very interesting techniques being developed to attack cancer.

Friday, July 08, 2005

Room for Rent - Toowong

Large room in furnished two bedroom unit

  • Room has built-in wardrobe / storage space, nice views from window
  • Unit furnishings: fridge, microwave, stove, utensils/cooking equipment, espresso machine, couch, dining table, washing machine; (single bed for room can be supplied if required).
  • Located in Explorer Street, 10 mins walk from buses, trains and shopping center
  • Share with PhD student in mid twenties - i.e. me :-)
Availability
  • Male or female
  • Students from abroad welcome
  • Non-smoker preferred
  • Available 21 July
$115 / week, plus bond and utilities

Contact: 0403 939 167 / 3371 8052 / gmail: james.cole

Thursday, July 07, 2005

Facade - a one-act interactive drama

Facade - a one-act interactive drama. Sounds interesting.

"Facade calls itself a one-act interactive drama, and is an attempt to create realistic 3D AI characters acting in a real-time interactive story, where you can talk to them via a natural language text interface. The player is cast as a visiting longtime friend of Grace and Trip, a couple in their early thirties, and ends up in a verbal crossfire resulting from their failing marriage." (via Slashdot)

It's available as a free 800MB download, or on 2 CDs by mailorder.

Tuesday, June 28, 2005

Genetic Algorithm Deathmatch

Seeing this Slashdot story on this use of machine learning in a computer game, made me wonder if anyone has tried to do anything like use genetic algorithms to control and evolve AI players in something like a Quake deathmatch?

Chuck a bunch together with random algorithms... the players that survive longer get duplicated and modified. The appealing thing about that is that the players would be in a fairly complex environment, which might help drive towards fairly complex behavior, and that it could be fully automated - the players, the selection and modification. The complexity of the environment includes the 3D environment, other AI players, their strageties, how they handle the various types of situations that come up, etc etc.

I'm not that interested in spending the time to seriously look into this but I did this google search, which seems to include a few such things, such as the work described in this paper.

Sunday, June 26, 2005

A Less Obvious Use of Logging Information

I think a lot of good things could come if applications kept more detailed logging information, as Jon Udell has talked a bit about recently. Imagining the sorts of uses such logging could be put to is difficult, however, I think, and this post is simply about one posisbility.

Temporal organisation of, and access to, of information seems to be pretty powerful. We seem to fairly good at associating things with a time period, or at least a position relative to other temporal items.

I was trying to find some things I'd written somehwere in all my PhD-related files, sometime mid-late last year, but there wasn't any easy way to find them because the temporal information in the system is too meagre.

Windows keeps the date of the last update to a file, but that is not very useful for this purpose. A simplified explanation of why is that even though the majority of the text in a file might have been written back then, I might have made some minor update or change to the file at any time since then, so the date of last update is not really a very good indicator of when text in the file was written.

What I need to be able to do is ask the system when the majortiy of the text (say 70% or more of it) in the file was last updated. Without going into all the sorts of technical issues, if you kept detailed logging information about changes to files, you could do this.

User Interface Principle: Operations Applicable to Representations in Any Context

Here's a user-interface principle: if you can do some operation X to some reprepresentation of some thing, A, in some context, then you should be able to do X to any other representation of A in any other context, unless there is a reason not to. My impression is that in most programs, which of the representations of an item you can perform an operation on is a fairly ad-hoc.

Here's an example of where I'd like such a design. I use Winamp (v5.04) to play MP3 files, and when you search for files, you can right click on an item in the results and choose to move that file to after the current song (being played) in the playlist. But if you right-click a file that's in the playlist itself, there's no option to move it to after the current song, which I often find frustrating.

I'm not up on writings on UI stuff, so I have no idea what might have been written about this kinda idea...

Causes Can be Effects

Causes can be effects

When you find the cause of an effect it's easy to think that's the end of the story, but we need to realise that that cause may itself be an effect of another cause... and so on. The most significant of the causes of an effect may be a number of steps back in this chain.

Monday, June 20, 2005

A Fair Perspective On Increasing Diversity of Choice?

Negative effects of change impinge on our consciousness and we are all prone to seeing this change as those negative effects, and the prior situation in a positive light -- as their absence. We do not compare the positives and negatives of the change against those of the prior situation. Virginia Postrel points out some thinking that's fallen into this trap with respect to the increasing diversity of choice in modern life. (via A&L Daily)

Thursday, June 16, 2005

Aim low and you shall achieve

Sunday, June 12, 2005

A Reciprocal Deal

When naturalistic methods of obtaining knowledge suggest a different view from religious ones, should they respect those views and not try to compete with them? Salmon Rusdie says that it might be fair to answer "yes" but only if there was a reciprocal deal, with a "yes" answer to the flip-side: should religious views respect the naturalistic ones and not try to compete with them?.

Monday, June 06, 2005

Showing Date of Most Recent Contents Modification

It would be good if Windows Explorer could, when it's listing the details of a folder, optionally show the time of the most recent update to the folder's contents. By the most recent update I mean the modification time for the most recently modified file within the folder's (transitive) contents. This way, when I’m backing up folders, I can easily tell whether any changes have been made within a folder since I last backed it up.

Another use for such a detail would be sorting folders based on how recently an update was made to them. I think this would be quite useful, as only a small majority of folders are that actively used, if my experience is anything to go by, and if you equate activity with relevance then such sorting would allow you to more easily focus on these relevant folders and ignore the less relevant ones.

Sunday, May 29, 2005

Short Article Critiquing Intelligent Design Movement

A very nicely written, well argued, piece on why the Intelligent Design movement has a flawed and rather underhand modus operandi.

Monday, May 23, 2005

Requirements on Understanding for Software Brains?

Ricky writes: "Until we fully understand how the human brain operates, I don't see how it is possible to download somebody's mind and have it do anything constructive."

Ray Kurzweil believes that we can do it without needing to understand how it works. He thinks that if we can have high-enough resolution scanners, such that we can get an accurate scan of the physical structure of the brain, we can -- basically -- encode and simulate that structure within a computer. Doing this would of course require a suitable understanding of the way the low-level physical structures work, but it would not require an understanding of what the actual neurones and higher-level structures were doing.

Do I think this is possible? I don't know whether it is possible, but I'm not aware of anything that could rule it out. That is, it seems to be a matter of "we'll have to wait and see".

Perceptual Adaption At Work

Just a quick observation... I often work on my PhD stuff at a local coffeeshop, and sometimes it's a bit nosiy so I listen to music on headphones...

at first I have to have the music fairly loud to block out the other sounds enough but there's a quite noticable difference that occurs after some amount of time -- I dunno, maybe 5-10 minutes -- where the music sounds a lot louder and I can turn it down a fair bit but still effectively block out the sounds.

The transition is not that noticable, but that there has been a change (no doubt a gradual one) is. What seems to be happening is that my brain is adapting to the headphone sounds, and getting better at focusing on them and at filtering out the other sounds.

Sunday, May 08, 2005

Re: Language for Talking, and Thinking, About Evolution

A reply to a comment from Bevan on my last post:

>Comments:
>Some interesting thoughts here James, I've got some of my
>own opinions :-).
>
>In the first section (situation instead of environment) I
>would more carefully consider who is using the term
>environment when analysing the correctness of its usage. I
>certainly consider environment to be more than the physical
>landscape. My housemate for example is doing her PhD in
>ecological modeling. She (and people in similar fields) do
>use the term environment correctly. Factors such as
>biodiversity, population distribution and the presence of
>predators / prey are all important consideration for them
>when talking about environment. You are certainly not going
>to convince them to change their correct use of environment
>to situation because a portion of population use the term
>incorrectly. Isn't it a matter of educating / correcting
>people on the proper meaning the of term rather than consider
>it tainted and ditch it for a new one?

I don't want to imply that nobody uses it correctly, but I still think that in practice people -- even some experts -- think of the envrionment in a too narrow way (regarding my note of 'even some experts', I think, for example, that some such mistaken thinking by experts was cleared up by John Maynard-Smith's Evolutionarily Stable Strategies (except I don't think that article describes it very well, but it was the best link I could find) concept).

If this is the case then of course their notion of 'environment' needs correcting. But with respect to describing evolution, I think that even if with a proper understanding of 'environment', the notion of 'situation' is a more /appropriate/ (not more correct) term.

I should also make it clear that I'm not trying to change anyone else's vocabulary, I'm just trying to figure out what I think is the clearest way of thinking about these concepts.

>Regarding the use of increase and optimise - note the s not
>the z you seppo :-). I agree that changes due to natural
>selection is better expressed using "optimise" rather than
>increase. There are however cases where an organisms fitness
>does increase due to natural selection. If a change in the
>organism results in that organism being far more successful
>in its environment does this note denote a increase in the
>fitness with respect to that environment? Success can be

I don't have any problem with the concept of fitness as something that can be increased or decresed. I think that optimisation -- with an 's' just for you! :-) -- leads to increased fitness. I think that it can cause problems however, to characterise evolution as a process that "increases fitness".

I think that doing so paints a picture of fitness as something like a numerical quantity that can be increased or decreased, and where you can compare these numerical values across different environments and species. I think that talking of evolution optimising fitness helps avoid these problems. Any particular optimisation will lead to an increase of fitness. But there's no universal measure of fitness that is you are constantly bumping up.

I think it's easy to misunderstand this point, and think that it implies some sort of extreme "fitness relativism" where there's no means to make any comparison in terms of fitness or in terms of other concepts such as "sophistication" or "complexity" of design.

Fitness may be relative to situation, and no two situations may be /completely identical/, but situations can share a lot of similarities. After all, every situation in this universe is under the same laws of physics (or at least I don't think we have any reason to believe otherwise). And there are surely certain types of abstract problem solving abilities that have a very broad range of applicability, to give another example.

>measured in a number of ways of course: population density,
>height in the food chain, susceptibility to harsh
>environmental changes, etc. Take the example of a carnivore
>diversifying its diet to become an omnivore. This will likely
>come about due to changes in its environment, e.g. lack of
>prey. If by widening its diet it really begins to flourish
>could this not be called an increase in the fitness with
>respect to its environment?
>
>There is some really good reading about this: Carl Sagan's
>book Cosmos (first 50 pages for so I think) has a very good
>argument for natural selection and explanation of how it
>happens. Jared Diamond's books 'The Rise And Fall Of The
>Third Chimpanzee' and 'Guns, Germs And Steel : A Short
>History Of Everybody For The Last 13,000 Years'. For
>something easier and more entertaining I've got the David
>Attenborough's 'Life of Mammals' DVDs. They've got some
>interesting explanations about the evolution of mammals.

Ah, all books that I would like to read but haven't yet :-). "Guns, Germs and Steel" in particular.

>Good luck with the PhD...

Thanks.

Wednesday, May 04, 2005

Language for Talking, and Thinking, About Evolution

A lot of people recognise that the language we use to talk about evolution is, if taken literally, quite inaccurate. The following are some musings, hastily written up, on how to more accurately describe what is going on. I haven't thought these things through much, and I haven't really looked at whether the suggested alternatives would be suitable for practical situations (like considering whether they are too unweildly or not).

Use 'Situation' instead of 'Environment'

We talk of the creature's environment setting up the selection pressures. Properly understood, there's nothing wrong with this. At the same time, I think the conception of 'environment' most people have can mislead them when thinking about this. The term 'environment' can conjure up the environment of the landscape around the creature, the other plant and animal species. That it can tend to obscure is that the other members of the same species are part of the environment, and that the results of the creatures own behavior is also part of its environment. I think it can also obscure the fact that the environment is not just the physical place, but the unfolding and changing environment over time (over time the selection pressures will change). For these reasons, I think the reality is better captured by the term 'situation'. The creature's situation sets up the selection pressures.


Use 'Optimize' rather than 'Increase'

We tend to say that evolution works to increase a entity's fitness. I think there are two reasons why this can be misleading. It implies that there is some one dimensional value that is being increased... which is okay if you understand that value as an "abstract" fitness. It's just that it doesn't capture well the multidimensionality of the factors that actually make the difference to survival and propagation. "Increase" also suggests a ladder and some path of progress... but this is a bit misleading. For fitness is always relative to the current environment, and what is fit will change as the environment changes. It is not so much that we have steadily increasing fitness, but that the system's fitness "tracks" the changes in the environment. (this is not to say that because 'localized changes' don't always lead to greater general sophistication the biosphere will not end up creating greater complexity over time). For this reason, I think that it is better to talk of creatures fitness being continually optimized rather than continually increasing.


Talk of Natural Selection and Evolution as Products Not Forces, and of optimization potentials instead of implicit goals

When we talk of evolution at work, we tend to say things like "evolution created eyes so animals could hunt their prey". This language is inaccurate because it implies there's an active force pushing, or trying to push, the evolution in a particular direction. But natural selection and evolution is not so much a force that does things, but the product of certain types of situations.

It's the product of situations containing the three factors of variation, heridiblity of that variation, and, basically, competition for survival. When these three factors are present, natural selection and the evolution of forms are the consequences. That is, the natural selection process and the evolution of forms are emergent phenomena.

I started reading Stuart Kauffman's At Home in the Universe last night, and I think there is some of this confusion about evolution in his consideration of how self-organising systems relate to evolutionary processes, though I don't have time to go into the details here (so you can ignore this statement if you want :-)).

We talk of creatures, or evolution itself, evolving some feature for some purpose. This is really just a way of talking and is quite inaccurate. Creatures can't direct their evolution like this, and neither can evolution itself. Evolution does not have goals, and even if it did, it doesn't have any foresight that it could use to reach them. (thinking about evolution as if it did have goals and/or foresight seem to be very common problems). We can much more easily see this when we understand that natural selection is an emergent phenomenom, and I think part of the reason this problem occurs is because of seeing it as some sort of force at work.

It seems difficult to talk of evolution without talking about goals. We talk of evolution as coming up with solutions to problems (it's goals are to solve those problems). What's really going on, however, is that a particular situation provides certain opportunities for creatures to evolve in certain ways. That is, in any given situation, there might be various ways that a creature could potentially evolve that would improve its fitness. If the appropriate mutations happen to occur, the species will move in one or more of those directions. So it's not so much that there is a problem to solve -- a goal to be attained by solving it -- but that the environment possesses opportunities that creatures can happen to evolve towards. I would describe these opportunities as optimization potentials (and remember of course that any change in the environment, including the evolution of a particular species, may change the optimization potentials for it). So natural selection may end up meeting optimization potentials. So perhaps you can say something like "the unfolding situation made use of an optimization potential to evolve feature Y in Xs".

So we can say stuff like "The situation selected for Y", "Optimization emerges from a situation", "Xs evolved feature Y by natural selection's optimization".... but as I said at the start I haven't really thought about using this language in a practical context... and I don't have time for this right now.

Tuesday, April 26, 2005

An Example of Circular Argument Structure

Okay, so the presentation of this idea is pretty awful, but I just don't have time to try and make it better....

There's a kind of circular argument you can get when you consider that the truth or falsity of a claim inversely affects the truth or fality of competing claims, and you reason on this basis without having any independent justifications.

For example, here's one to do with AI. The reasoning goes as follows. First, we might think that human intelligence seems to be non-computational, and therefore artificial intelligence can't be right.

Then, on the basis of believing that artificial intelligence can't be right (for the aforementioned reason), we take this to bolster our view that human intelligence is non-computational.

The logical structure of this is belief in A adds strength to belief in B, which then in turn adds strength to belief in A again. That last step makes it a circular argument.

I think that this particular example is actually quite common. It's a fairly easy mistake to make because the logical structure of what is going on is usually hidden away in the particular way the views are being expressed, and because it's easy to forget or not think carefully about the reasons why we hold the original belief.

Comment on "Weekend Tagging Thoughts"

A comment I added on this post in the Library Stuff weblog on whether the author of a post should be able to tag their work or not, because there are some negative effects if the author can. I suggested that avoidance wasn't the only option - you can also adapt to situations, which is sometimes a better option.

Indicating Occurrences On Search/Replace Dialog

I'd like it if the search and replace dialog boxes in text editors and word processors would give you an indication where in the document the next, or even all, the occurrences of the search term are. With all the ones I'm used to using, when you click to find the next occurrence, it just jumps you wherever in the document it is, which I can find disorientating.

It could, for example, give you a small visual map of the document, which highlights the occurrences. The sense of where the occurrences are located would enable you to see, for example, whether your search term has picked up all the occurrences you expected it to (if there's one section of the document where you were expecting matches but where there aren't any, this could lead you to realise that you've entered in a slightly wrong search term, or misspelt the items in that place).

There are various other ways this sort of information could be conveyed. For example, it could have a special display containing an entry for each occurrence, showing the line it is on and perhaps a line or two above and below it for context, and also something like a little image of the document to show where the lines for that entry are located. The entries could be listed one after the other, to give you a view upon the document focusing on the occurrences.

I wouldn't be surprised if there's a system out there that does something along these lines, or if not, that someone will try something like this sooner rather than later.

Note For Self on Book "A Moving Experience"

Keeping with the idea of using my weblog to write notes for myself.... I picked up Shelley-Maree Cassidy and Grant Sheehan's book A Place to Stay: 30 Extraordinary Hotels for something like $5 at a bookstore's bargains table and really liked it... and I wouldn't mind getting this similar book of theirs sometime: A Moving Experience: Holidays on Wheels, Water and Wings. (there's also this book which is probably the same one but under a different title or at least similar, Vacations on the Move: Exotic Experiences on Wheels, Water and Wings Around the World).

Monday, April 25, 2005

Structure Makes Structure

.
Structure makes structure


That might quite a general principle. Or that's at least what robotic orangutans and penne pasta have led me to believe.

Earlier today I was reading Steve Grand's fantastic book about the nature of intelligence, Growing Up With Lucy. Trying to build something is a really good way to understand it, and Grand is building a robotic orangutan in order to try and understand things about how intelligence works. It really is a fantastic, insightful book, and I would recommend it to anyone -- after all, who isn't interested in the nature of our selves?

One of the book's key points is that the brain seems to be made up of all sorts of different maps of things (of visual information, of where muscles are located, and so on), and a lot of what the brain is doing is transforming information between these maps.

It turns out that genes only need to specify a small proportion of the details of these maps and pretty blind and simple processes can "figure out the rest". Grand gives a plausible account of various ways this could happen, though acknolwedging that it's still speculative and it hasn't been fully put to the test.

One of the ways is how the mappings between the different "formats" used by the maps could be created simply by having the maps generate random information that, because it's coming from this map with a particular structure, reflects the structure of that map.

He also gives an account of how the structure in the environment can be used in a fairly blind way to build up important structures in the brain (the 'orientation detectors' in the primary visual cortex).

Anyway, both these things are examples of structure + non-structure makes more (or greater) structure. But I didn't really think of in these terms till I was making some pasta for lunch.

I don't usually use penne pasta, but there was this recipe I wanted to try and it called for penne and who am I to disobey? One of the reasons I don't usually use it is that it tends to clump together as it cooks, which means you have to take more time out to stir it[1].

The reason that penne tends to clump together, and most other pasta does not, has to do with their shape. Being cylinders, pieces can stick together along their lengths, and end up all pointing in the same direction. (I suspect that them being hollow cylinders might have something to do with it also, as the water currents flowing through them might cause them to line up with each other). Other pasta tends to be irregular shapes (at least as they become soft while they're cooking, anyway) that don't provide regular surfaces that can cause clumping like this.

With the ideas from Steve Grand's book bubbling away under the surface of my mind, it occurred to me that these clumps were a form of higher-level structure that were made possible by the lower-level structure of the pasta shapes. That is, structure making more complex structure. It seems like any structure that's there provides a hook that can be used for building more structure. I haven't really thought it through, but I suspect that this is the only way you can build structure... that sounds right to me.

I don't think this would be any surprise to people who have looked at things like complex systems. From what I've read, this is the kind of way they talk about complex systems. The only thing I can say is that I don't recall having read the point being made that explicitly.

I know there would be other ways of putting the concept, but just as a test I did a google search for this phrase. At the moment it only returns a single result, and that's a mis-hit (where the first 'Structure' is at the end of one sentence and the following 'Makes structure' is the start of the next sentence).

update: I thought I should explain a bit more about what I meant. When I said that structure makes structure, and that 'I suspect that this is the only way you can build structure' and that this view 'sounds right to me', I did have something more specific in mind. "Structure makes structure" describes what's going on with evolutionary processes, for one thing.

Evolution is a process whereby new structure is created by a process of unstructured changes to existing structure (random mutations of genetic structures) that are "guided" by the structure of the environment (what increases "fitness"). If the environment was "undifferentiated" or "random" this wouldn't happen. It has to have the pre-existing structure for the evolution to make use of. What I'm saying is that evolution is a blind process by which two existing sources of structure are used to make more structure. Thats existing structure making more structure -- an instance of structure makes structure.

If structure makes structure, then what makes structure in the first place? There's two kinds of answer to this -- the "ultimate" answer, and the "in this universe" one. The "ultimate" answer really concerns the question "what, ultimately, is the universe", which we don't know the answer to. The "in this universe" answer concerns the question of "where in this universe does the structure come from". The answer to that is, it comes from the nature of the actual laws of physics (not our formulation of them, but whatever they actually are). These cause matter to interact with other matter in regular (that is, structured) ways, and, at least according to the view expressed in this post, all other structure emerges from this lowest level form of structure.



[1] If that sounds somehow petty to you, then it's probably because you're confusing the explicit listing of reasons "penne clumps, means more stirring, thus avoid buy", which were written in that way for the purposes of explaining something in this post, with some "logical" train of reasoning that you imagine I must go through. If you, on the other hand, you think that it's a bit petty to make the effort to avoid penne like I'm doing, then re-read the previous sentence. Going further afield in my digressions, I suspect that a vague sense of "pettiness" we can feel about such things comes from our persistent "moralising" about things in which, amongst other things, says its somehow bad to do anything that might give you slight conveiences. Don't think I'm saying morals aren't important; I'm just pointing out that we need to think about those we're using.

Saturday, April 23, 2005

Deaf Divers

Just a minor observation. One thing that really impressed itself on me when I went scuba diving is just how low the communication bandwidth is while you're down there. There's a few hand signals and gestures you can use, to indicate things like "I'm okay" or "look at that", but you can't really communicate with the other people you're with (so I was kind a half jokingly thinking "so this is what it's like to be a creature like a dog or a cow without any real language..."). And all this made me think that if you and your dive buddy could sign, you'd be set.

Playground Waterpump

Nice bit of 'thinking outside of the box': A company in South Africa has found a way to harness youthful energy, by using a playground roundabout to power a borehole pump, to help address the perennial problem of water supply in rural villages (BBC News, via Robotwisdom).

Friday, April 22, 2005

Tightening the Screws

Paul graham’s article, partially on a topic that interests me greatly: tightening the screws on bullsh*t. The article partially concerns how changes in the communication ecology -- blogging -- are tightening these screws.

Monday, April 18, 2005

LBDES: Manipulation via Means of Expression

As part of the Looking Back Down Explorer Street series of posts...

(This has to do with how cognition and communication involving expression/representation of abstractions, and specifically the expression of them)

There are various ways we can manipulate others and ourselves by the way we express things. We can obfuscate the meaning of what we say. We can exploit the tendancy to consider a statement to be reasonable as long as it is factually true. We can also misleadingly frame a situation.

Obfuscation

Certain language can, intentionally or not, obfuscate meaning. Obfuscation exploits the quirks and limitations in the way we interpret and reason about statements, such as our limited capabilites to remember earlier things we've heard/read, and the various ways our emotional strings can be pulled.

The language can make it difficult to see what is actually being stated, by making it seem like one thing is being meant where in fact another is. This obfuscation can be intentionaly used for all sorts of ill-ends, such as sneaking in inconsistencies that help falsely support/defend an argument, describing a situation in a way that obscures its true nature, and saying something that, while not false in a literal sense, is highly misleading.

Equivocation is one type of obfuscation. Equiovcation can be quite subtle, making it hard to detect and point out. I think a reasonable example of this is this one where the notion of success is first treated as success in finishing a particular task but then subtly treated differently as an asbtract notion of success.

Another type of obfuscation hides the mundaneness of your statement under the appearance of meaninfulness and significance. One technique for this involves asserting identity between two different things, where really the relationship between them is much weaker. For example, there might be a tv station slogan that says "Channel X is sport".

Because the two things are not the same, and often quite different, yet are related, your mind tries to see them as the same but can't quite grasp it, and this creates a vague but potentially potent sense of sigificance, as if you've been presented with something that is really meaningful.

The phrase 'Persistance is the triumph over skepticism' is another example of this.


Exploiting The False Belief That Factual Truth is All That Matters

Until we learn better, we tend to belive that a statement or claim is fair as long is it is factually true. This is a false belief, because things can be factually true but still misleading.

That a statement can be factually true but misleading is due to several factors. The meaning of a statement is not simply its literal meaning, but its meaning after it has been interpreted according to the various conventions we use for communication. Also, our ability to interpret statements is limited or biased in various ways, and a factually true but misleading statement can be constructed in order to exploit these weaknesses. And in addition, we evaluate statements with various measures and heuristics that have limitations or weaknesses that can make factually true statements misleading.

One form of limitation is that we tend to evaluate a statement in a somewhat self-contained fashion. That is, we will evaluate the content of the statment by applying various measures/heuristics that apply to it and its meaning, without really considering the statement in terms of what other knowledge we have or what came earlier in the conversation or argument and then applying the measures and heuristics.

To give one kind of way this can be done, in an argument one person can make a claim about what the other person's argument has been, and they can present it in a way that is consistent with the factual details of the actual argument but also in such a way that exploits the heuristics-with-a-narrow-view in order to present a misleading view of the argument, as I have given a somewhat more concrete example of.


Misleading Framing

The means of expression can frame the way we look at a situation.
This is one of the effects of the way that we express something, outside of the factual content of that expression. Saying that it affects 'the way we look at it' is a bit vague, but that's the best I can do at present.

To be a bit more specific, but ultimately not much more concrete, the framing affects the kinds of things we that think of about the situation. One thing that the framing can definitely do is subtly bring in assumptions without ourselves or others realising it. An example of this involves some bird behaviour that was misinterpreted as being 'for the good of the species' because of the way it was described.

Because we don't realise an assumption has been made, this can effectively block us from seeing any other alternaties, because we basically don't realise that there was something there that had the possibility of alternatives. I suspect that all forms of misleading 'framing' are actually all cases of making unknowing assumptions.

A slightly different means of embodying assumptions is by what I've called implicit categorisation. An example of this, which also explains what implicit categorisation is, comments on something from an introductory philosophy book, where implicit categorisation is used to seemingly justify a particular position, without actually providing any justification for it. This implicit categorisation is very closely related to the things I talked about under the heading of 'Obfuscation', above.

Language that poorly frames situations can be symptomatic of problems with the reasoning strategies that are constructing the statements. If we want to avoid assumptions, or avoid them as much as possible, in our statements, then we need to find the most general way of describing the situation that is consistent with the facts that we know about the situation. The reasoning statements can be problematic if they are too hasty in construct descriptions, constructing ones that seem to fit the situation, but without considering what the alternatives are, and just how they relate to the known facts. (really, this talk of facts is a bit of a simplification. It's more a case of how they relate to what we believe to be true, and factoring in the degree to which we believe they are the case. It's just that I don't have a decent shorthand way of putting this at the momenet.)


Discussion

I suspect that these three ways of manipulating via the means of expression seem more distinct than they actually are. Concepts such as how we 'frame a situation' are fairly vague, and I think we can be more specific and get into the specific types of mechanisms that are underlying such thoughts. I expect that doing so will dissolve these apparent categories or replace them with a more accurate means of classification.

Major New 'Discovery' of Ancient Greek and Roman Works

Not the kind of discovery (via Arts and Letters Daily) you expect could happen these days: we now have on our hands about a massive twenty per cent more of the text from great Greek and Roman works. An infra-red technique has been used to read a previously indescipherable collection of papyrus texts originally found at the end of the 19th century. (and yes, I know this story is over a day old).

Saturday, April 16, 2005

LBDES: Lack of Awareness of Perceptual Component of Abstractions

As part of the Looking Back Down Explorer Street series of posts... again, a bunch of notes on a theme, and kinda abstractly presented.

The following is about a potential problem with our knowledge or awareness, or lack thereof, of the nature of the abstractions we reason with.

Abstractions can divide up the world according to how we perceive it, rather than according to any real divisions that exist out there in the world. To effectively reason with abstractions we need to understand how much our own perception contributes to the nature of abstractions we are reasoning with.

Here are some examples of things that have a strong perceptual component. Colors are a classic case. The colors we perceive are based on objective features of the world, but the manner in which we divide the world up into the different colors is a property of our perceptual/cognitive systems and not the objects themselves. To give another example, the reason that we call something analogue or digital, or descrete or continuous, is somewhat surprisingly often perceptual, and not to do with the things themselves.

Here is an example that shows how this lack of awareness can impact on the effectiveness of our reasoning. This example involves the notion of species, and the full details are here. Evolution works by the gradual transition between forms by means of natural selection. Some people incorrectly think that a 'species' is a collection of things of a particular type out there in the world, and that through evolution we should find intermediates between species in the fossil record. And since there aren't such intermediates, then a conclusion that can be drawn is that evolution is wrong.

But in fact, since there is gradual change in the fossil record there are no natural sharp boundaries where we can say these things are of species X and these are of species Y. Our notion of 'species' is ultimately a construction. The notion of species has to do with how we cut up the world, not how the world is. There are no intermediates between species because when we find a fossil that is not clearly in one or another species that we've created, we always decide to put it into one or the other. In other words, the notion of species we have created does not allow for intermediates between species.

Wednesday, April 13, 2005

Some T-shirts from The Onion

Mainly a note for myself... some I wouldn't mind, or that could be presents for some people I'm thinking of...
Stereotypes are a...
The sports team from my area...
Let the... (rude language)
I am in a promising...
I enjoy drinking...

LBDES: Conviction of Correctness of Feelings

As part of the Looking Back Down Explorer Street series of posts...

A bunch of notes on the topic outlined in the following paragraph.

If we feel that something is the case, there's a tendancy for it to be accompianied by the conviction it's correct. As you might expect. Except the criteria your brain subconsciously applies, to determine how much conviction you have in a belief, is flawed, and this means if you want a better judgement you have to consciously determine what level of conviction you should have in your beliefs. There's also a natural conviction that the belief shouldn't be questioned, though I hope I don't need to say that there's nothing that simply "shouldn't be questioned" and I won't talk about this more (though I know there are people who believe this).

The crtieria can not, it seems, be affected consciously (though other conscious critiera can be be given precendence over it, see below). It seems to be subconscious and because of this, "hard-coded" and thus an evolutionary adaptation, and thus, like all other evolutionary adaptions, is a heuristic "designed for" the nature of the environment at the time the adaption was created. For this reason it can't make use of the kind of knowledge that culture can develop, and we should be surprised that it's imperfect.

(I made some notes on this tendancy. One saying almost exactly what I've just said. Another noted the line in the Radiohead song There There that goes "Just cos you feel it doesn't mean it's there". I also noted that, on the importance of evaluating your feelings, or more specifically, your perceptions, that the theoretical physicist Brian Green thinks doing so is important, because not doing so is a major reason people are held back from making breakthoughs.)

Since it isn't a reliable indicator of correctness, other means are required to evaluating feelings. We can, for one thing, simply become aware that feelings aren't always right, and try to always keep this in mind.

The following are some examples of these convictions of correctness.

We have a natural conviction (feeling) that we we feel our memory is accurate, it is. It is now well understood that our memory often "plays tricks" on us (though I haven't yet noted down any references for this). The only things related to this I've noted down are the following. Lafcaio Hearn made the point that it's important to preserve first impressions, because you can't see the same thing through the same eyes twice. I also noted that "[m]ost of our own past is as a story whose details we recall" (this is the full text of the post found here).

There is the conviction that we are aware of what we are doing. Not a constantly held conviction, but in the sense that if we asked whether we are aware of what we do, we we would probably say of course we know what we are doing. But in fact it can be very difficult to maintain awareness of what you are doing and particularly that you're switching over to another task - which if you had awareness of, you'd realise that there were things you still had to do as part of the current task.

There is a tendancy to think that an insight or solution that is fairly simple, and to which there's no obvious impediment to thinking of it, would be easily thought of. I don't think this is the case. There's lots of stuff that's only obvious in hindsight. I gave an example, involving the purchase of a bus ticket, of the kind of simple thing that can be unobvious. This example can also be seen as an example of the lack of awareness you can have of what you are doing.

(As a comment on that last link, I suspect that a lot of the things we presume we've figured out ourselves are actually things we've picked up from others. In other words, that copying skills and knowledge from others plays a much larger role than we tend to think, as argued in Susan Blackmore's book The Meme Machine. And this isn't a bad thing -- if its how it is, it's how it is and always was.)

Tuesday, April 12, 2005

LBDES: Plausibility Reckoning

As part of the Looking Back Down Explorer Street series of posts...

Determining the plausibility of a claim is one type of reasoning task, which I am calling plausibility reckoning. Naturally, some of the means by which we undertake plausibility reckoning are flawed.

One such means uses imagination as a judge. The plausibility of a claim is tested by trying to imagine some situation or way that the state of affairs could arise or have existed. And if the imagining comes up blank, the judgement is: not plausible.

Unfortunately, imagination is a poor judge at this, because it simply can't match the complexities of the world. The possibility that coming up blank is a limitation of your imagination looms much larger than the possibility that your imagination has a correct insight into the nature of reality.

To consider one type of claim, of whether some thing will be possible in the future, it means little if a person can't imagine how the thing could become possible. In the realm of technology, for example, the possibility is always impacted by future technological advances which we in the present are not privy to.

Another flawed means of plausibility reckoning is to compare this thing to what we are familiar with and to reject it if it seems too different. This is really just a special case of the first means. You are again assuming that if the thing is plausible, you ought to be able to find some positive justification for believing it is -- such that lack of such positive justification implies implausibility. In this case the supposed justification is that it is like other things you know exist.

On this blog I noted down two examples of flawed plausibility reckoning, one historical, one recent. The historical one involved an early description of geisers that was submitted to a publication but rejected because they "don't print fiction". The more recent involved giant ocean waves that were rejected as myths but are now known to exist.

I think that we have a tendency to look back on such things as being reasonable judgements for their time and place, thinking "any reasonable person would have made the same judgement". This expresses a belief that there is no reliable means for avoiding such mistakes. But while it seems likely that there is no universal method, what we can do is rule out all the means that, while intuitively appealing, are not reliable. As I believe these means are.

I believe a more adequate approach, instead of trying to find a reason why the thing might be possible, is to see if you have any good reason for believing it couldn't be possible. If you can't find any good reason then you have no grounds to reject it. This doesn't mean you believe it is definitely true, it means you have no grounds for making a judgement. And this is okay.

There's a belief that we always have to make either a yes or no (approval or disapproval) judgement on thing. We can't sit there without making a definite judgement. But I believe this is in fact false. Quite often there is no reason at all to make a one-way-or-another judgment, and not even a reason to make any sort of judgement (I haven't done a proper justification of this yet).

Even if we do need to take some action based on our judgement of the thing, what we need is a definitive action not some definitive belief about the actual plausibility. What we can do is make a judgement of what is most likely and then go one-way-or-the-other through the action that we take. It is our actions that require definitiveness, not our judgements of the situation -- we can be definitive with our action and still undecided about the plausibility.

People seem not to decouple judgements from their actions. If there is a need for definitive action, they see it as a need for definitive belief, and this leads to some degree of dogmatism, which fills the void of a substantial justification for the judgement made.

The flawed means of plausibility reckoning by trying to see a reason why the thing might be possible, and rejecting if you can't see such a reason, is an example of our overconfidence in our perception of the world. We think that because we can't see an answer, an answer must not be there. As such, we need to always take the nature of our own perception into account, and consider whether one of its limitations could be responsible for how things seem to be, and not the world itself.

LBDES: Reasoning Over Statements is a Major Area Where Language Can Affect Thought

As part of the Looking Back Down Explorer Street series of posts...

On the topic of Language and Weilding Abstractions...

While it may be clear that there is potential for problems to arise through language use, it is less clear that they do occur with sufficient frequency, and with sufficient damage, to warrant making much of a fuss over them. After all, we pick up language naturally as children, and we seem to get by on a day to day basis. But despite this, I think that poor language use can and does have substantial negative affects on our thinking, and I want to explain why I think this.

I believe the problems mainly occur when we reason over langauge statements. And this seems to be a common part of our langauge use. In verbal conversations, we recall what we and others have said, and think about the meaning of those statements. Especially if it's an argument. We reason about the consequenes of the views expressed in those statements. We think about what is consistent with those views, and what things aren't. We tend not so much to recall the meaning of what is said, but rather what is said, from which we then rederive the meaning. In other words, it is easier to remember what was said than exactly what was meant.

We tend to be able to deal fairly well with the meaning of utterances if we are directly taking in that utterance, such as if you were listening to someone else say it. We automatically follow all the background conventions to derive the meaning of the statement from its literal statement. When, however, we have to explicitly reason about the meaning of a statement, such as considering what other things it entails, what it contradicts with, we are not so good. We can't just use our automatic, unconscious system to extract the meaning and then reason in terms of that meaning. We have to actually consciously be aware of those subtleties and apply them when reasoning about the statements.

Looking Back Down Explorer Street

From December last year to March this year I didn't post much to this blog. Part of the reason was that I was busy in Jan to mid-Feb preparing for my PhD confirmation (which I ended up passing) and then from late-Feb to late-March on holidays overseas.

The other reason was that I was working behind-the-scenes on a kind-of summary of what I'd written to this weblog, which I was hoping to finish and post before the end of last year. But the work on it blew out and I didn't get it finished. Still haven't.

I've realised I won't have time to do all that I originally intended, so what I'm going to do instead is take what I've done so far and post it in a piecemeal fashion. The structure isn't there to put it up all in one coherent post. I'll have to try doing things in a more organic fashion.

This is like another realisation of how much more it was going to take than I'd thought, on top of the realisation to that effect that I'd already made, as you'll read about below :-).

Here is the original description of what I was trying to do:

This post tries to create a coherent description covering, and linking to, the various things I've written so far on this blog. It tries to draw out the various concepts and topics that appear in those posts, to see how they relate to each other and to organise them into larger themes. It covers the period from August 2003, when I started the blog, to the present, December 2004.

The two reasons for this post are to provide a kind of index into what I've been writing about, and to help me to organise and clarify my thoughts on those topics. I started this blog with a morass of thoughts in my head that I really wanted to bring some more clarity to. I was pretty sure that there were connections between them, and themes running through them, but I had a lot of trouble seeing those with it just in my head or in the notes I'd tried writing down in the past. So I was hoping that the blog would, along with giving me some writing practice, help me get some of this clarity.

I thought that rather than trying to just write down my thoughts off the bat, I would work in a more bottom up fashion. I'd try to pick fairly small, focused things to write about, and try to give a fairly solid description of that thing, and hopefully by doing so get a clearer idea of the more general things I'd been thinking about. I think this strategy has worked fairly well, and this post is an extension of it, a kind of second sweep through, where I'm taking as raw material the posts I've written and trying to clarify and synthesise things.

That sounded relatively easy to me at the time, and I have to wonder when I am going to learn to disregard my intuitive judgement on how long things will take and how hard they will be, or at least learn to multiply these judgements by about fifteen. So things blew out a bit as I had to write and write and write in order to try and get some of that clarification and synthesis, and it was almost like re-writing each of those posts. If it was just a matter of summarising what I'd written, I could condense things down, but as the form of the ideas changed as I rewrote, I ended up with a lot of text.

Some caveats. My main purpose at the moment is simply to try and describe my thoughts, and I don't do much of a job of justifying the points I make. I wouldn't want you to think I'm just trying to assert these things without providing a good justification. I think I need to get it clearer what I'm actually saying before I can, or before it makes sense to, try and give that justification. And of course, in trying to give that justification for thoughts, it may turn out that a solid justification doesn't exist. Also, what I've written about so far is only bits and pieces of my thoughts, and it's not meant to be some sort of treatise on my-view-of-everything.

So after much ado, here's looking back down Explorer Street...


...and as you'll see, even though this started out as a kind-of summary, I ended up writing a lot of new stuff that hadn't been covered earlier.

Wednesday, April 06, 2005

Yes to All Older Files?

In Windows, when copying a file would overwrite an existing one, it asks 'Confirm File Replace?' and gives you the options of 'Yes', 'Yes to All', 'No', and 'Cancel'. Often I find that a 'Yes to All Older Files' would be handy, like when I'm backing up files.

Tuesday, April 05, 2005

Recent Returns

Some recent returns, after gaps of some years, from a few people whose work I follow:

Amon Tobin has a new album (actually, it's the sound track to the computer game "Tom Clancy's Splinter Cell 3: Chaos Theory", but it's still pretty damn good. The song "El Cargo" is awesome).

(update: Michael has pointed out this interview with Amon Tobin about the album. It answers something I've been wondering about: was it a side project, or the major thing he'd been working on since his last album. The answer: a side-project. A new album is due out late this year or early next year).

The Robotwisdom weblog is back, after a long hiatus.

Ian McEwan has got a new book, Saturday. I haven't read it yet, but it's been getting good reviews.

update: I should also mention Lemon Jelly's fine new album '64 - '95.

For stuff I'm looking forwards to... Boards of Canada are supposed to have a new album out this year. And there's Greg Egan who hasn't published anything for three years... I've been wondering if he's been up to anything.

Some Words That Sound Rude But Aren't

Here. (via Undernews, via Robotwisdom)

For example:

Windfucker
1.) Name for the kestrel [species of Hawk].
2.) fig. as a term of opprobrium.

Oxford English Dictionary

Monday, April 04, 2005

Notes for Self on Shoulder Posture

This post is more to help me out than for anyone's reading pleasure :-), as explained in the next few paragraphs. So if you're interested you might want to read them, and then possibly skip the rest.

I've been plagued by muscular tension for ages, coming from... well, it's not completely clear. Having had all the problems for a long time is itself a major source, perhaps all of it now.

From time to time I've realised various postural things I'm doing that is contributing to it. It's always something subtle. I'm not even sure how i manage to figure out the right posture. Usually the current posture i have feels alright, even though its not. Or at least any deviation from it feels funny. Recently I think I've had another insight into it.

This post is to document what I'm doing and what I should be doing posturally with this insight, in order to help me remember to do it and how to do it. Because the right posture feels unnatural, it is, as I've discovered many times in the past, very easy to get it right for a while but slowly slip back into the bad habits and hard to realise this and remember what I should have been doing.

Part of the problem is that we don't have any ordinary vocabulary / concepts for describing postural positions, and without these it's hard to remember these details. So I'm hoping that by writing it down it will help fix it in my mind, and give me something I can periodically check up on. And the blog seemed the best place to do it, as the combination of chronological order and web search makes it easier to manage and find things you've written.

So here goes...

I get a lot of tension in my shoulders... and I think this causes a lot of tension in my neck. When I was at the chiropractor last he was telling me this position, that I wasn't aware of, that i can put my arms in to rest those muscles.

And doing that gave me an intuitive sense that my shoulder posture was wrong, and that this was causing a lot of the tension. My implicit mental model was that shoulders were either up and tense or down and relaxed, and as much as I tried to relax them it just didn't seem to work.

See, what was happening was that I've been trying hard to sit/stand up straight and tall and as part of this had been lifting up my chest and the front side of my shoulders (if you talk of the shoulders running up from the front side of the body, onto the top of the shoulders, and down on the back side). This didn't feel like lifting up my shoulders but it was.

What I've realised is to let them "sag backwards" and what it feels like to do so. Doing this doesn't really feel like standing up straight, and I think part of that is that when I do it, my neck tends to tilt forwards. It's a lot of effort to draw my neck up and keep it more properly vertical when I do this.

Holiday photos: Singapore and Malaysia

Here's some photos from my holiday in Singapore and Malaysia.

February: pg 1
March: pg 1, 2, 3

Sunday, April 03, 2005

Condense Text

Is there a mobile phone with a feature that can, if you want it to, 'condense' the text in your SMS? Sometimes I'm writing an SMS and I realise I want to condense it -- reduce the number of characters -- and I have to go back and change things like 'and' to '&' and stuff like 'today' to '2day'. I'd like the phone to be able to do this for me.

Why not write write the SMS using abbreviations in the first place? Why should I? Some abbreviations are uglier, and, with the way the predictive text works on my phone, some take longer to type in.

Ideally, the phone would have several levels of condensing that you can apply, starting with milder condensing that involves less drastic changes but frees less space, up to that involving more drastic but more space-saving changes.

Saturday, April 02, 2005

Article on Teaching Kids Mandarin to Make Them More Competitive

In the New York Metro (via Robotwisdom):

To make their babies competitive in the global economy, parents are making them learn Chinese.

Hilton Augusta Rogers, 1 year and 10 months old, as blonde and blue-eyed a baby as ever was born in Manhattan, looked at the waitress taking her parents’ order at Shun Lee West, and said, “Bao bao!” which means “Pick me up!” in Mandarin. Startled, the waitress picked her up. Soon, other wide-eyed waitresses gathered around. One said, “Point to your nose” in Mandarin, which Hilton Augusta promptly did—as her parents, Jim Rogers and Paige Parker, a private investor and an aspiring author, looked on, beaming.
(Makes me feel more confident in my decision, a few years back, to learn Mandarin, in that, aside from just wanting to learn another language, doing so could be quite useful).

Friday, April 01, 2005

Cartesian and Radial Metaphors for Thinking About Change

Clay Shirky identifies (or did, a few weeks back) two prototypical ways people think about technological change, which he metaphorically associates with cartesian and radial coordinate systems. (though he's talking about technological change, it seems applicable to any type of change)

Radial people assume that any technological change starts from where we are now — reality is at the center of the map, and every possible change is viewed as a vector, a change from reality with both a direction and a distance. Radial people want to know, of any change, how big a change is it from current practice, in what direction, and at what cost.

Cartesian people assume that any technological change lands you somewhere — reality is just one point of many on the map, and is not especially privileged over other states you could be in. Cartesian people want to know, for any change, where you end up, and what the characteristics of the new landscape are. They are less interested in the cost of getting there.
(as one of the comments to the article points out, this is focusing on the journey vs focusing on the destination, which is perhaps a better way of putting it, but anwyay...)
I think it's a useful identification/distinction. I think, though, that what Clay presents as the Cartesian viewpoint is really more a "naive" Cartesian viewpoint, attributing to it naive views that are not inherent to it.

I also think he makes the folk psychology mistake of considering attributes and dispositions to have "complete coverage" and always apply to every facet of the person's perception and thinking -- where we say, for example, that some person is a good person, or a bad person, or a mischevious person, or a radial person, or a cartesian person, as if they had this essence of badness or whatever.

But this radial/cartesian thing can apply to different facets of someone's thinking. For example, it is better, I think, to consider possibilities, in a cartesian fashion, and then once you have figured out what is possible, to think consider how we can get there in a radial way. It is possible for a single person to be able to apply both forms of thinking about a situation.

I also disagree with the concluding remarks
There’s no answer to any of this — as Grandma used to say, "Both your maps are nice."
which sound like relativism to me. That sort of conclusion comes, I think, from thinking of the radial/cartisian as things in themselves, as is done when thinking about them in "complete coverage" terms, and thus concluding that "they both have their good and bad points, and thus one isn't superior to the other". But when we consider how good something is or isn't we always have to ask *for what?*. The mistake that relativist thinkers make is failing to do this, and thinking that things have some single property -- some "absolute" property -- of good/bad, useful/not useful or whatever. When we consider "for what" we can usually say something more decisive. (I know this is a very brief presentation of this argument, and probably not convincing to you, and I wish I had more time now to try and elaborate on it).

Wednesday, March 30, 2005

Slashdot Article Summaries?


The comments following the articles on Slashdot often contain some gems of additional information -- hidden under tonnes of junk. It'd be useful if people would wade through the junk and find the useful stuff so you didn't have to.

There is, of course, nothing stopping people now from adding comments to the discussion that contain this 'best of' information, but I think the way things are set up at the moment is not as conducive as it could be to doing so. Perhaps the simplest way of doing it would be to have separate types of comments for these 'best of' type summaries, simply so you could jump straight to them.

Creating these summaries would be a bit of work, so there is an incentive issue here. Slashdot employees would have a pay incentive. But I think you'd also want to slashdot readers doing it, and for them the notoriety incentive could work -- by gaining a reputation for creating good summaries. It's fairly obvious there's a parallel here with blogging.

Metaphors We Learn Languages By?

If the argument in Lakoff and Johnson's Metaphors We Live By is correct -- and it seems to me that their basic thesis, that the substance of language and thought is metaphorical in nature, has plenty of evidence and is hard to deny -- then could this knowledge be usefully applied to language learning, if it is not already?

If a large part of learning a language involves learning the metaphors used to express various concepts, then perhaps it would be profitable to more explicitly focus on teaching these metaphors. This is particularly because, as Lakoff and Johnson show, many metaphors are used and related in a systematic and comprehensible way. Understanding these details could be useful in making the language learning less rote and more grounded in understanding, which helps in reataining and applying knowledge.

Thursday, March 24, 2005

What You'll Wish You'd Known

Paul Graham gives advice, for graduating high-school students, but applicable to anyone who wants to make something of their life. Not the usual "follow your dreams" stuff, but on the mark, I think.

Sunday, March 13, 2005

Jon Udell's Google Maps Screencast

Jon Udell provides a five-minute screencast tour of his home town, using Google Maps. A week or two old now, but cool as a demonstration of both the screencast medium and Google Maps.

Tuesday, February 08, 2005

Struck me as a nice line: "When the adults say follow your dreams, they mean only the ones that fall within a narrow band of acceptable behavior and historical results".. though I thought the movie review it's from was a bit mixed.

Monday, January 10, 2005

False Neutrals

In one of his blog posts, Clay Shirky writes:

We need a word for the class of comparisons that assumes that the status quo is cost-free, so that all new work, when it can be shown to have disadvantages to the status quo, is also assumed to be inferior to the status quo.
Hear hear! In my opinion that is a very common mistake. I use a term for such things, and here's a very quick, sketchy description:

I believe this is actually the conjunction of two mistakes. The first is the mistake is the assumption that if you can demonstrate that something has positive aspects then it is good, and similarly that if you can demonstrate that something has negative aspects then it is bad. (The reality is that you have to consider the combination of the positive and negative aspects, and compare them to those of the other options, and to see which aspects are important for what is being considered. You also need to not assume, when considernig a particular option that isn't the way things are now, that if was realised the world will be the same as is now, because otherwise you are unfairly biasing the evaluation against them... but I'm getting away from my point here).

The other mistake -- which is the thing Shirky is primarily talking about in that quote -- is to assume that one of the options is fine as it is, such that you don't evaluate it, only the others. I call these options false neutrals. I've got a feeling that this doesn't just apply to the status quo, though off the top of my head I can't think of any examples.

(BTW, that post of Shirky's is quite good, and I think it's a good example of how people tend to think of things in pretty much only in terms of their ostensible purpose and how they aren't very good at realising, or factoring in, 'economic' sorts of considerations).

Loud Sound, Bright Flash

Each night, some time after I've switched off the light (I'd say about 20 minutes after, but I'm not sure if it's always the same amount of time) and gone to bed there's this 'bang' sound that comes from the light fitting above my bed. I think the noise is caused by part of the fitting cooling down and at one point suddenly deforming. By the design of it, the light bulb actually touches part of the fitting, and consequently the fitting seems to get very hot.

Now what's strange about it all is that if I'm lying in bed when it happens, I see a flash of light. I'm pretty sure, however, that there isn't really any flash of light, and it's just a construct of my brain. There's been times when I've had my eyes open when the sound happened, and there was no flash, and there's something abou the flash that I see that makes me think it's a mental construct -- it kinda feels like what I'm seeing is "deeper" in the perceptual system than something that comes from the eyes, though I don't really know how to explain this. I'm not sure if I always see the flash, and I don't recall having this visual effect accompianing in sounds in other situations.

It's strange, but for a while I never thought about it being strange that I was seeing this flash of light. I'm wondering: how common/uncommon is this? I would not be surprised if it was quite common. I'm also wondering if this could be some sort of synthestisia effect, or whether it is it something else? If you're wondering, I don't think I have anything else that could be interpreted as synthestisia (and if you think it would be obvious whether you do or don't, it's not necessarily so -- my dad has been aware of synthestisia for a while, but it wasn't until he listened to some of the descriptions of it in a radio program he was listening to that he realised that he seem to have a mild form of synthestisia involving numbers -- it's apparently not all just perceiving things in terms of different types of perceptual sensations).

Cringely: How to Build a Global Internet Tsunami Warning System in a Month

Robert X. Cringely argues that governments are not the right people to build tsunami warning systems: too slow, too expensive -- and that it can be done, and quicker and cheaper, on a more grassroots level.

Thursday, December 16, 2004

The Onion: Nigeria Chosen To Host 2008 Genocides

The Onion reports:


ABUJA, NIGERIA—At a celebratory press conference Monday, President Olusegun Obasanjo announced that Nigeria's troubled but oil-rich city of Warri has been chosen to host the 2008 Genocides.

Thursday, December 09, 2004

Grief as Precautionary Tale?

I don't know whether anyone has brought this up before, but since I haven't come across it, I thought I might as well jot it down here...

People have often wondered about the biological function of the kind of deep, lasting grief that accompanies events such as the loss of a child. Why is it so debilitating, and why can it be so debilitating for such a long period of time? Wouldn't it make more biological sense to let the person get on with their life and the business of propagating their genes?

In Stephen Pinker's book How the Mind Works (which would more accurately, but with less impact be called, "An Overview of What We Currently Know About How the Mind Works") he notes that such grief seems to act as a kind of deterrent - basically, knowing how awful it feels acts as a major deterrant to any behavior that might lead to those kinds of circumstances arising.

It occurred to me that perhaps the deterrance is not just for you -- but for those around you, and that this factor could help explain why it is so highly debilitating (if in fact this actually requires any separate explanation). Not only do you experience how awful it is, but others can also see how awful an effect it can have on you. And since in the times when evolution was at work we lived mostly in tribal groups with large numbers of relatives, Kin selection would explain how this kind of grief could evolve to serve "both" these purposes.

Perhaps just the right impact on the grief is where it has a large precautionary effect on the other kin members at the expense of really debilitating the grieving person? (i.e. this is the level of grief that results in greatest chance of those genes propagating, because the least number of people carrying the gene make the mistake that led to the grief).

How Explicit Does a Representation Have to Be?

Some people (and I don't think they're the only ones) talk about representations as if something was only a representation if it was in some fairly explicit form that can be read by some process which then interprets its meaning.

For example, consider the rules of grammar that our brains respect (to a certain degree) in the production of speech. Under this view of representation, there are two options for how these rules exist in our brains: either these rules are represented in the brain, or they are in some sense built-in to the brain without being represented. In the latter case the system in some sense knows the rules, but it doesn't explicitly represent them -- the brain just works in a way that respects the rules, just as a calculator doesn't explicitly represent the rules of arithmetic, but just operates in a way that respects them.

This distinction between things that are represented and things that are 'built-in' sounds fine on the surface, but I'm suspicious of there being a real distinction there. Certainly the distinction makes intuitive sense. It's easy to imagine an explicit representation there that is to be read off and used. And its also easy to imagine the other case, of a system with no representation, that just works in a way that respects the rules. However, the thing is that a representation is represented by some encoding scheme. You can represent something an unlimited number of different ways (of course, different ways will have different properites, such as how long it takes to read the representation, how much space it takes up, etc etc) and in each and every case what is important is that you have the right means of interpreting the representation.

And amongst this unlimited variety there are encoding schemes that more explicitly represent the thing and those that do so less explicitly. So my question is, is there just a spectrum here, from very implicit representations right up to very explicit reprsentations? And is it possible to to make any hard divisions of this spectrum? I strongly suspect that it is not possible to make any hard divisions or distinctions.

In the case where the brain simply respects the grammar rules but does not explicitly represent them would still be a case of the brain representing those rules, but just implicitly. Taking another tact on this, I don't see how the brain can "know" the rules yet not in any sense have a representation of them. With the right means of interpretation we can still 'read' the implicit representation (not that we, as people trying to understand how the brain works, necessarily have the means to determine this means of interpretation). In other words, some aspect of the system's organisation implicitly encodes the rules, and the way that that organisation interacts with and influences the behaviour of the rest of the system consitutes the interpretation of those rules.

It may seem a bit of a stretch to call such implicit cases 'representation'. But if what I'm suggesting is correct, then there's no hard distinction between "explicit representation" and "implicit representation", and thus the common meaning of representation is making a hard distinction that doesn't exist. Thus, if we are looking for technical accuracy (and of course we are often not) then we either have to modify the common meaning of the word or find another term that can have a more accurate meaning.

Tuesday, November 16, 2004

The Roachinator and Lycra-Clad Chickens

This is just fantastic. An article in the Australian reports into cutting edge scientific research in robotics (link via The Thin Line).

"The robot, InsBot, developed by researchers in France, Belgium and Switzerland, is capable of infiltrating a group of cockroaches, influencing them and altering their behaviour."

"The third stage, undertaken by the French Centre for Scientific Research in Brittany, was to isolate the molecules that give cockroaches their smell -- to create a cockroach perfume".
I think this is going to be big. I can just imagine it: Roach, by Calvin Klein
"InsBot, which is green, the size of a matchbox and equipped with lasers and a light sensor, was developed by Switzerland's Federal Polytechnic School in Lausanne."
From the description it's obviously some sort of cyber commando roach with shoulder mounted laser deaaath raaaays.
"Other applications are also envisaged for the computer programs developed under the Leurre project. Guy Theraulaz, CRCA director of research, said it may be possible to build chicken-like robots that will be used to stimulate poultry."
That sounds a little raunchy. I don't know if I'd want to eat that at KFC. Wait a minute -- I see, my dirty mind was getting away from me a bit there -- it's some sort of robot that reads shakespeare to the chickens.
"A lot of chickens don't move at all and die as a result. They need to be encouraged to run around. Robots could do that," he said.
Oh, I see. It's good to see the poultry industry making efforts to increase efficiency by utilising modern technology with their robo-chicken exercise instructors. "C'mon girls, lets move those bodies, kick those legs! We want to be 97% fat free. Yeah. Now some star jumps!".



(While it might sound like I'm being sarcstic about this technology, I actually think it's very interesting and has a lot of promise. It's just, some of those lines in that article...).

Sunday, November 14, 2004

Why Computer Games Give us a Way of Looking at the Problem of Qualia

Qualia is the mystery of mysteries. If the world really is just processes involving aggretations of atoms, then what kind of thing is that sensation that is the taste of an orange, what kind of thing is the visual image we see when we look around?

There's lot of other things we don't understand, but with other problems we usually have some idea of what an answer might look like. But with qualia we literally have no idea.

It seems impossible that it could be the product, like everything else, of processes involving atoms. It must be some special sort of entity, we think. And there may be literally no way for us to understand it, or if there is, we may not be smart enough to gain that understanding.

For an abrupt change of context, there's a tribes person living in an untouched, remote area. They have never seen or heard of modern technology, and they are given a gameboy. They see the little person on the screen, they see them moving about an environment, and they see how they can control this person's actions. It must be some sort of magic.

They know of nothing that is even remotely like this gameboy, and they have absolutely no idea how any such thing is possible. They have no idea of how they could even begin to understand it. But we know it can be understood, we know there's no magic.

Could qualia be to us like the gameboy is to the tribesperson?

Friday, November 12, 2004

Thinking Outside of the Ought

Yeah, Paul Graham gets it. He doesn't restrict his thinking to the space of what things ought to be about -- he actually thinks about what's going on. Why does a particular candidate win an election? The political attitudes of the populus, the things that influence these attitudes, etc, of course. Well, at least that's what you'd expect it's about, that's what it ought to be about, but wrong tree argues Graham. The answer he suggests is very simple and easy to see if your view isn't blinkered.

Sure, people understand it's important (read the article to see what I'm referring to), but I think it's clear they don't appreciate just how important it is, how important it is relative to other issues -- after all look at some of the candidates the parties have chosen, as Graham points out, or the apparent lack of real effort to address charisma issues.

And let's put this into the right perspective: the US, the most powerful country in the world, lots at stake in presidential elections, huge resources put into the opposing sides. And: a simple notion that easy to see if you're view isn't blinkered, massively overlooked by all these people over many decades who've had huge stakes in these elections. Election results in the most powerful country in the world could've been different -- that's the size of those blinkers.

Thursday, November 11, 2004

Dawkin's Review of Intellectual Impostures

Richard Dawkin's 1998 review of Sokal and Bricmont's Intellectual Impostures. Pretty good stuff - and interesting for his insights, not just what he says about the book. Right now I'm too lazy to try and describe what the book is about, but here's the first paragraph of the review:

Suppose you are an intellectual impostor with nothing to say, but with strong ambitions to succeed in academic life, collect a coterie of reverent disciples and have students around the world anoint your pages with respectful yellow highlighter. What kind of literary style would you cultivate? Not a lucid one, surely, for clarity would expose your lack of content.

Wednesday, November 10, 2004

Goddamn it irks me when people try to be critical or insuling of something and dress it up in humour on the pretense that they "don't really mean it"; where they want to mean it but be able to claim that they don't mean it. Of course, you can say something and and only half-heartedly mean it, and you can say something purely for the joke -- I'm only talking about the situation where someone is doing it because they want it both ways. Good, now that I've got that off my chest, I return you to your normally scheduled programming... :-)